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I. INTRODUCTION 
The primary focus of most environmental regulatory activity has 
been the control of large polluters. 1 Increasingly, however, regula-
tors confront a different set of problems when regulating small, 
diffuse polluters. This Article analyzes some of those problems by 
examining a recent initiative of the Regional Water Quality Control 
Board for San Francisco (Regional Board) to regulate the discharge 
of waste by small boatyards into San Francisco Bay. 
Many small marinas line the coves and inlets of San Francisco 
Bay. The marinas house small commercial and pleasure craft. Many 
of the marinas have small boatyards that service the boats---clean-
ing, repairing, repainting, and keeping them seaworthy. Some of the 
paints, abrasives, and solvents routinely used by the boatyards con-
tain toxic substances that prevent the formation of barnacles and 
other marine growths. When boats are cleaned and sanded at the 
yards, toxic paint particles come loose, and are washed into the Bay, 
if not contained . 
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of California, 1991; Ph.D., University of California at Berkley, 1980; B.S., University of 
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Administration, Carlton University; M.P.P., University of California Berkley, 1992; LL.B., 
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In 1990 the Regional Board decided to curtail this discharge. Many 
of the issues the Regional Board encountered were different from 
the issues it had experienced previously in dealing with large Bay 
polluters. This Article reviews the Regional Board's experience in 
developing this small polluter regulatory program, and identifies 
several important lessons which are generally applicable to the reg-
ulation of many small polluters. 
At the time this regulatory program was initiated, the small boat-
yards in the Bay area shared a number of important characteristics 
which illustrate the considerations involved in regulating small pol-
luters. Typical of many small businesses, the small boatyards were 
extremely concerned about potential compliance costs. They had not 
been subject to significant regulation in the past, and did not have 
the resources that large businesses might have to devote to compli-
ance considerations. In addition, the small boatyards operated in a 
highly competitive market in which customers were able to switch 
businesses easily. The boatyards were, therefore, particularly con-
cerned about the possible disparate impacts of non-uniform compli-
ance costs. Finally, each boatyard perceived itself as contributing a 
relatively small amount of discharge into an already highly polluted 
Bay. 
These characteristics had three important consequences for the 
boatyard regulation which are common to many cases involving sim-
ilarly small, relatively unsophisticated polluters. First, the boat-
yards were predisposed to resist regulation. Second, there was con-
cern that the Regional Board impose its regulation uniformly. 
Finally, the fact that each boatyard was responsible for only a small 
part of the overall San Francisco Bay pollution problem both en-
hanced the boatyards' resistance to the regulation, and reduced the 
incentives for the Regional Board to devote considerable time to 
dealing with the concerns of individual boatyards. 
This Article argues that the concerns observed in this case point 
to the importance of conciliatory regulatory attributes when regu-
lating small polluters. In particular, the Article discusses the value 
of enhanced communication, uniform regulation, and explicit guid-
ance when regulating small polluters. Section II reviews the back-
ground to the boatyard regulatory program. Section III argues that 
enhanced communication is required to deal with the "why pick on 
me?" problem that is to be expected when regulating small polluters. 
Part IV argues that the manner in which an agency responds to 
complaints is particularly important for the regulation of small pol-
luters for two reasons. First, there is a tendency for a complaint-
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driven enforcement mechanism to result in non-uniform regulation. 
Second, unless safeguards are in place, the need to respond to com-
plaints on a case-by-case basis can dictate an overly legalistic and 
confrontational regulatory attitude that ultimately may be counter-
productive. Finally, Section V argues that issues may arise as a 
consequence of the lack of sophistication of many small polluters (like 
the boatyards) that may compel a rethinking of the emerging em-
phasis on regulatory mechanisms designed to maximize flexibility. 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE BOATYARD REGULATION 
A. The Tributyltin Problem 
Concern about boatyards discharging wastewater with residues 
of anti-foulant paints containing organotins, especially tributyltin 
(TBT) generated much of the impetus leading to the boatyard reg-
ulation. Scientists have described TBT compounds as "the most toxic 
compounds ever deliberately introduced by societies into natural 
waters."2 TBT is a biocide with a variety of commercial uses such 
as pesticides and preservatives. 3 One of the most effective uses of 
TBT is as an anti-fouling agent incorporated into hull paints. 4 TBT 
is by far the most effective anti-fouling agent ever developed. 5 
For centuries sailors have fought against aquatic organisms that 
grow on the submerged hulls of ships. 6 Fouling colonization by algae, 
limpets, barnacles, and other organisms results in fuel-consuming 
drag. 7 Even a small buildup of organisms on a ship's hull impedes 
its progress. 8 On a large ocean-going ship the use of effective anti-
fouling hull paint can result in savings of millions of dollars per year. 9 
2 Edward D. Goldberg, TBT: An Environmental Dilemma, 28 ENV'T 17, 17 (1986). 
3 TBT compounds are used as fungicides, bactericides, and as preservatives for woods, 
textiles, paper and electrical components. Id. at 18. Use of TBT compounds as a biocide is 
controlled by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). See 7 U.S.C. 
§ 136 (1982). 
4 Goldberg, supra note 2, at 19. In tropical oceans, ships may not begin to experience 
significant bottom fouling for five to seven years if painted with TBT-based paints, compared 
with less than one year if painted with the best alternative, copper-based anti-foulants. 
Research Needs Concerning Organotin Compounds Used In Anti-Fouling Paints in Coastal 
Environments, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, (U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Rockville, MD), March, 1988, at 1-5. [hereinafter NOAA ReportJ. 
5 Goldberg, supra note 2, at 19. 
6 See Michael A. Champ & Frank L. Lowenstein, TBT: The Dilemma of High Technology 
Anti-Fouling Paints, 30 OCEANUS 69, 69 (1987). 
7 See id. at 69-71. 
8 See id. at 71. 
9Id. 
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Even the operators of small boats realize significant savings in fuel 
and cleaning costs with the use of anti-fouling agents. 10 
Sailors traditionally fought hull fouling by the application of me-
tallic poisons to their boats below the water line. 11 In 412 B. C. sailors 
applied mixtures of arsenic and sulfur to their ships' hulls. 12 The 
Phoenicians attached strips of copper to ship hulls. 13 Current anti-
fouling strategies incorporate metal compounds that are toxic to 
aquatic organisms into paints and coatings used on ships' submerged 
hulls. 14 The toxic compounds leach from the paint or are exposed by 
the continual ablation of the paint, creating a "fresh" toxic surface, 
and thereby preventing the attachment of organisms. 15 In addition 
to preventing the colonization of the boat surface, anti-fouling com-
pounds also leach from the paint into the water and settle in the 
sediments below, preventing the growth of organisms in the water 
and in the benthic sediments. 16 
TBT-containing paints became commercially available in the mid-
1960'S.17 A decade later scientists became concerned about TBT's 
affect on the environment. 18 In both France and the United King-
dom, TBT from paint on recreational vehicles moored in sheltered 
harbors concentrated in the water and in the sediments, nearly 
devastating the adjacent oyster aquaculture. 19 Oyster harvests in 
these areas yielded oysters with malformed, delaminated shells, 
greatly reduced edible tissue, and high concentrations of TBT in 
10 ld. 
11 Susan Scott, Painting With Pesticides: The Controversial Organotin Paints, 33 SEA 
FRONTIERS/SEA SECRETS 414, 416 (1987). 
121d. 
13 Champ & Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 71. 
14 See Scott, supra note 11, at 416. 
151d. at 417-18. 
16 See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 19-20. At low concentrations TBT acts as a neurotoxin, 
entering the nerve tissues, at higher concentrations TBT acts as a surfactant, disturbing 
tissues. Roy B. Laughlin, Jr. & Olof Linden, Fate and Effects of Organotin Compounds, 14 
AMBIO 88,90 (1985). Effects on a number of marine organisms have been seen at concentrations 
of TBT as low as parts per trillion. Champ & Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 72. This is 40 to 
50 times more toxic than copper oxides, the next best anti-fouling agent. Carl M. Adema & 
Paul Schatzberg, Organotin Antifouling Paints and the Environment-Drydock Phase, NA-
VAL ENGINEERS J. 209, 209 (May, 1984). See also M.J. Waldock and J.E. Thain, Shell 
Thickening in Crassostrea gigas: Organotin Antifouling or Sediment Induced? 14 MARINE 
POLLUTION BULL. 411, 414-15 (1983). 
17 Goldberg, supra note 2, at 18. 
181d. at 19. 
191d. at 19-20. 
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their tissues. 2o Additionally, the inability of newly hatched oyster 
larvae to "settle" and grow in the areas of high TBT concentration 
threatened to ruin the local oyster industries. 21 
TBT problems were greatest in the shallow, quiet waters of small 
bays and harbors where large numbers of small recreational boats 
were moored.22 Accordingly, in 1982 France banned the use of TBT-
containing paints on all non-aluminum hulled pleasure craft less than 
twenty-five meters in length. 23 In 1986 Britain banned the production 
of copolymer paints with more than 7.5% TBT and other paints with 
copper or other anti-fouling agents containing more than 2.5% TBT.24 
In subsequent years, the concentration of TBT in the affected areas 
has diminished, the oysters have gradually returned to normal 
growth patterns, and the annual settlement of new larvae has re-
covered more each year. 25 
B. United States Legislation 
Efforts to limit the use of TBT as an anti-fouling agent began in 
the United States in the late 1980's.26 Scientific concern, the expe-
riences in France and Britain, and an announcement by the United 
States Navy that it planned to paint the entire fleet with TBT -based 
paints stimulated efforts to limit TBT use. 27 Alerted to the dangers 
ofTBT by scientists and fishery lobbyists, Congressional committees 
20 Id. 
21 See id. In France, healthy oysters transplanted to the affected areas suffered 50% mor-
tality in 130 days. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 19. 
22 Id. 
23 Goldberg, supra note 2, at 19-20. The French, and subsequent British and U.S. exceptions 
for aluminum were made because there are no good alternatives to TBT for aluminum hulled 
boats and motors. Copper is the second most common anti-foulant for boat paints. Champ & 
Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 74. Copper based compounds, however, cannot be used because 
copper painted on aluminum hulls results in a corrosive reaction that destroys the hull. I d. 
24 Golderg, supra note 2, at 20. 
25 Id. 
26 See Champ & Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 71. Concerned scientific and fishing commu-
nities initiated regulation of TBT. Judith S. Weis & Leonrad A. Cole, Tributyltin and Public 
Policy, 9 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 33, 37-38 (1989). Local scientific concern in the 
late 1980's prompted a "facilitated dialogue" held at the University of California that resulted 
in a consensus among attending scientists on TBT risks to the marine environment. Scott 
McReary, Facilitated Dialogue Produces Consensus on TBT Risks to the Marine Environ-
ment, 7 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 89, 89 (1987). Following this and other expressions 
of concern in the state, California enacted legislation to restrict the use of TBT. This legislation 
is codified at CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 110 et seq. (Deering 1992). 
'l:/ See generally, NOAA Report, supra note 4, at 1-11-1-13. 
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held hearings in 1986 and 1987,28 and passed the Organotin Anti-
fouling Paint Control Act (Organotin Act) in 1988.29 
The Organotin Act prohibits the use of bottom-paint containing 
TBT on vessels less than eighty-two feet (twenty-five meters) long 
except for aluminum hulls, aluminum outdrives and outboard mo-
tors.30 The statute also establishes a maximum release rate for all 
TBT paint.31 
The subsequent California regulation32 contains a similar prohibi-
tion on the sale and use of TBT-based anti-fouling paints for vessels 
smaller than twenty-five meters in length.33 Both the federal and 
state TBT standards incorporate the twenty-five meter size distinc-
tion adopted earlier in Europe.34 The explanation most often pro-
vided for this distinction is that TBT tends to concentrate in the 
waters of quiet harbors containing many smaller boats moored at 
small marinas. 35 The water in such harbors is shallower, the current 
slower, and boats housed there typically spend long periods of time 
moored at the dock. 36 Consequently, TBT leaching from such boats 
tends to remain and concentrate in the water column and sediments 
below.37 In contrast, larger commercial ships spend the majority of 
their time at sea, generally moving in deeper, faster flowing water 
which disperses the TBT.38 
28 Tributyltin in the Marine Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives 
99th Cong., 2d Sess., Sept. 30, 1986; The Effects of the Chemical Trlbutyltin (TBT) on the 
Marine Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Envtl. Protection of the Comm. on 
Env't and Public Works, U.S. Senate, l00th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 29, 1987). 
29 Organotin Antifouling Paint Control Act of 1988, 33 U.S.C. § 2401. This Act marked the 
first time Congress had passed a chemical-specific prohibition. 
30 33 U.S.C. § 2403. 
31 33 U.S.C. § 2402(6)(B) (1992). The Organotin Act completely prohibits sale or use ofTBT 
paint with a TBT release rate into the environment in excess of four microgranIs per square 
centimeter per day. Id. 
32 CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 110 et seq. (Deering 1992). 
33 Id., § 113. 
34 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
35 Interview with Mary Morgan, Legislative Aide to California Representative Dan Hauser, 
author of the California bill to regulate TBT, in Oakland, CA. See also Champ & Lowenstein, 
supra note 6, at 71. 
36 See generally, Champ & Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 19-21. In any 12-month season, 
the average pleasure boat moves less that two percent of the time. Scott, supra note 11, at 
417. 
37 Waldock & Thain, supra note 16, at 413. 
38 Other factors also may have played a role in TBT regulations that feature size distinctions. 
For example, shipping interests are likely to oppose strongly the prohibition of all TBT use 
on large commercial ships. TBT saves shipping companies millions of dollars per year in fuel 
and drydock costs. Champ & Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 71. Furthermore, most commercial 
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C. The Contamination Risk from Small Boatyards 
The federal and state regulations attempt to reduce the concen-
tration of TBT in domestic waters only by prohibiting its use on 
smaller boats and by limiting its leaching rate in paints used on 
larger boats. 39 Small boat owners, however, have used TBT based 
paints for over twenty years.40 As a result, TBT continues to enter 
natural waters from boatyard maintenance activities, such as sand-
ing or cleaning, both of which generate loose paint residues. 41 In-
deed, although the California statute specifically states that the 
removal of previously applied TBT paints is not required,42 the stat-
ute does not provide any guidance as to manner of intentional or 
incidental removal of TBT paints, or treatment of discharge contain-
ing TBT.43 
Concerns about water contamination resulting from cleaning and 
sanding processes are serious. Many small boats are repainted 
yearly, and many more are cleaned with greater frequency. The 
usual procedure is to haul boats out of the water on rails or cranes 
into the yard, where scraping, sanding, and repainting takes place. 
Prior to the boatyard regulation that is the focus of this Article, the 
boatyard workers would typically clean the yard by washing all 
residue directly into the Bay. 44 
D. The Regional Board 
The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (the Act) governs 
California water quality.45 The State Water Resources Control Board 
(State Board) is the controlling agency at the state level. 46 Nine 
Regional Water Quality Control Boards (Regional Boards) are es-
tablished under the jurisdiction of the State Board.47 The Regional 
shipping is international. Given that no other nation has banned the use of TBT on large 
vessels, any United States port prohibiting entry ofTBT-coated ships would be at an economic 
disadvantage. 
39 See supra, notes 23-35 and accompanying text. 
40 See Champ & Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 71. 
41 See Adema & Schatzberg, supra note 16, at 211-12. 
42 CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 112. 
43 See id., § 110 et seq. 
44 Interview with Tom Mumley, Director of Policy, San Francisco Regional Water Quality 
Control Board, in Oakland, CA (Sept. 20, 1990). 
46 CAL. WATER CODE § 13000 et seq. (West 1971 & Supp. 1992). 
46 [d. § 13140. 
47 [d. § 13200. 
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Boards have broad jurisdiction48 and enforcement powers, including 
the power to inspect,49 to restrict discharge,50 and to mandate clean-
Up.51 
The Act requires the State Board to establish a State Water 
Policy. 52 The Act then requires Regional Boards, using the State 
Policy as a guide, to prepare "Regional Water Quality Control 
Plans."53 These plans designate specific beneficial uses of water for 
protection. 54 The plans must contain water quality objectives and an 
implementation program. 55 In order to meet the water quality ob-
jectives, the Regional Boards are empowered to issue specific dis-
charge "requirements" to any polluter. 56 
Although the Act and the State Water Policy together provide 
some guidance to the Regional Boards,57 there is large amount of 
flexibility throughout the regulatory system. In particular, the Act 
does not mandate that the Regional Boards regulate specific activi-
ties or pollutants. 58 Furthermore, neither the State Water Policy, 
nor the Regional Plans carry the force of law to bind agency action. 59 
E. The Impetus to Extend Regulation to Prevention of Discharge 
Responding to pressure from public interest groups, including a 
suit by the Environmental Defense Fund for failing to adopt appro-
48 For example, a Regional Board has jurisdiction over any person in a given region who 
discharges waste that could affect the quality of the water in that region. [d. § 13263. In fact, 
the statute requires that anyone so discharging must file a report with the appropriate 
Regional Board. [d. § 13260. The Act gives the Regional Board the authority to determine 
the information required in that report, as well as discretionary authority to waive the 
reporting requirement. [d. §§ 13260, 13269. 
49 [d., § 13267. The Act gives the Regional Board general investigative powers including 
the power to inspect facilities and demand technical or monitoring program reports from 
dischargers. [d. 
50 [d., § 13263(a). The Act gives the Regional Board the power to prescribe requirements 
for any discharge so as to implement the relevant water quality control plan. [d. 
51 [d., § 13304. When its requirements are violated, the Regional Board may require the 
violator to submit a detailed remedial plan. [d. § 13300. The Regional Board may also issue 
cease and desist orders as well as cleanup and abatement orders. [d. §§ 13301, 13304. 
52 [d., § 13140. State policy is to consist of general principles and guidelines as appropriate 
for long-range resource planning and water quality objectives at key locations. [d. 
53 [d. § 13240. 
54 [d. § 13241. 
55 [d. 
66 [d. §§ 13260-67. 
57 See id., § 13241. For example, the Regional Board is to consider, inter alia, the following 
factors in setting water quality objectives: past, present, and future beneficial uses of the 
water; environmental characteristics of the hydrographic unit; possibility of coordinated con-
trol of all pollution factors; and economic considerations. [d. 
68 See id. 
59 CAL. WATER CODE § 13002. 
1993] SMALL POLLUTERS 461 
priate water quality standards in the Delta,60 the State Board held 
public hearings in 1987 and 1989 on San Francisco Bay water quality 
issues. The State Board produced a Pollution Policy Document 
(PPD), and in 1990 adopted the PPD as state policy for water quality 
control in the Bay area.61 
The PPD identifies and characterizes those pollutants that pose 
the greatest potential biological threat in the Bay-Delta Estuary. 62 
The PPD list includes TBT, noting that TBT concentrations in poorly 
circulated Bay-area harbors and marinas exceed levels known to 
cause adverse effects on aquatic organisms.63 The PPD directs the 
Regional Board to adopt a water quality objective for TBT.64 Spe-
cifically, the Regional Board is required to: prohibit the direct dis-
charge of TBT resulting from in-water paint stripping operations; 
evaluate the impacts of in-water cleaning of vessels; and require 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permits65 for boats and shipyards in order to regulate the discharge 
ofTBT.66 
Prior to the promulgation of the PPD, the Regional Board already 
had regulated all the large marinas and boatyards in the San Fran-
cisco Bay.67 The new policy emphasis on water pollution in the PPD, 
together with the specific requirements to regulate further the dis-
charge of TBT prompted the Regional Board to turn its attention to 
small boat yards. 68 Accordingly, after the PPD was promulgated in 
1990, the Regional Board began to establish a plan for the regulation 
of small boatyards. 
Before the Regional Board implemented its plan for the small 
boatyards, two important events occurred. First, a local public in-
terest watchdog organization, the Baykeeper, decided to draw at-
tention to the pollution problem represented by the small boatyards. 
The Baykeeper is staffed almost entirely by volunteers dedicated to 
monitoring and preventing pollution of the San Francisco Bay.69 It 
was in response to complaints from the Baykeeper about colored 
60 u.s. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct.App. 1986). 
61 California Water Resources Control Board, Res. 90-67, California State Pollution Policy 
Document (1990) [hereinafter PPD]. 
62 Id. 
ea Id., §§ 4.4.2, 5.3. 
64 I d., § 4.4.2. 
66 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1948). 
66 PPD, supra note 61, § 4.4.2. 
67 See CAL. WATER CODE § 13240 et seq. (Deering 1992). 
68 Interview with Mumley, supra note 44. 
69 Interview with Michael Herz, Executive Director, The Baykeeper, in San Francisco, CA 
(April, 1991). 
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sludge around a number of boatyards that initial action was taken 
by the Regional Board. 70 
Although the Regional Board had not yet instituted the small 
boatyard program, the Porter-Cologne Act clearly prohibited waste 
discharge from commercial sites, including the small boatyards. 71 
Nonetheless, the Regional Board had not responded to similar com-
plaints in the past.72 Why did the Regional Board simply not wait to 
handle the complaints as part of its forthcoming strategy? 
The answer appears to be that at about the same time it was 
developing the policy, the Regional Board hired a new employee, 
Ray Balcolm, to investigate and respond to complaints. Balcolm 
rapidly decided that the boatyards problem was serious. In Balcolm's 
words, he then actively engaged himself in a mission to seek out as 
many "bad apples" as possible. 73 At Balcolm's behest, the Regional 
Board conducted tests, and in some cases issued detailed compliance 
instructions. This ad hoc regulation triggered more complaints, in 
many cases filed by the boatyards that already had received compli-
ance instructions against their unregulated competitors.74 As a re-
sult, by late 1990, the Regional Board had effectively regulated about 
two dozen boatyards. 75 
III. PERCEIVED UNFAIRNESS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
COMMUNICATION 
A. The Boatyard Policy 
On December 7, 1990, the Regional Board held an informational 
meeting for owners of small boatyards in the Bay area. 76 The purpose 
of the meeting was to explain a new policy prohibiting discharges 
from small boatyards into San Francisco Bay. Approximately 150 
boatyard owners and other interested parties77 gathered to hear Dale 
Bowyer of the Regional Board explain that the new policy precluded 
70 Interview with Ray Balcolm, Enforcement Officer, Regional Water Quality Control Board 
for San Francisco, in Oakland, CA (Oct. 3, 1990). 
71 See CAL. WATER CODE § 13000 et seq. 
72 [d. 
73 [d. 
74 [d. 
75 Interview with Dale Bowyer, Senior Staff Officer, Regional Water Quality Control Board 
for San Francisco, in Oakland, CA (Oct. 3, 1990). 
76 Unless otherwise noted, all references in Section III to the December meeting are based 
on notes made by the authors while attending the meeting and observing the subsequent 
events. 
77 Including, for example, environmental consulting organizations. 
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the discharge of any contaminated waste into the Bay. The boatyard 
owners were told that they would have to devise a way to collect all 
particulate matter78 from the yards and to filter or settle out all such 
matter from any wastewater used in cleaning or washing down the 
boats or the yards themselves. The waste water would not be al-
lowed into the Bay except under very strict conditions for direct 
discharge, and if it were to be disposed of through the municipal 
sewer system it would have to be clean enough to meet any municipal 
wastewater disposal system standards. All solids collected would 
have to be disposed of "appropriately," most likely as hazardous 
waste. 
The questions from the crowd for Bowyer and his colleagues evi-
denced considerable hostility, distrust, and resistance, based pri-
marily on a shared sense that the regulation was unfair. This Section 
suggests that information and open communication are particularly 
important when dealing with small polluters. The dilemma, of 
course, is that information and communication are costly, and the 
costs may appear less justified to the regulator of small businesses 
that individually do not constitute a significant problem. 
B. Response to the Boatyard Policy 
The general sentiment among the boatyards immediately after the 
December meeting was that the regulation was either unnecessary, 
or at least mis-focussed, given the persistence of other, larger 
sources of Bay pollution. This sentiment manifested itself in the 
considerable resistance and hostility to the new regulation that per-
sisted throughout our period of observation. 
Many boatyard owners were concerned about compliance costS. 79 
Many owners also asserted the unfairness of being faced with higher 
standards than their larger colleagues. For example, one owner 
complained that the focus on boatyards was unfair when "Chevron 
can put a pipe into the middle of the Bay and pump out massive 
amounts of pollution. "80 In addition, some boatyard owners pointed 
to the diminishing quantity of TBT in their waste discharge, follow-
78 Particulate matter includes sanding residue and similarly common boatyard waste. 
79 Jim Boyd, the local United States Paint representative, who had spoken to several dozen 
of the affected boatyard owners, suggested that the word on the street was that the boat 
works would have to increase their prices between $50 and $75 per haul to cover the expense 
of the regulation. At that time, the average price per haul was between $100 and $200 
depending on the size of the boat. Telephone interview with Jim Boyd, United States Paint 
representative (Dec. 12, 1990). 
BO Interview with Mike Haley, Boatyard owner, in Oakland, CA (Oct. 24, 1990). 
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ing the prohibition of the use of TBT on small boats. The owners 
complained that the big drydocks that service large ships that still 
use TBT paints constituted a much larger problem.81 Many boatyard 
owners assumed that the regulation of small boatyards was tied to 
the state and federal regulations prohibiting the use of TBT on boats 
under twenty-five meters in length.82 Many argued that the larger 
ships and yards had escaped regulation solely because of their influ-
ence. 
The fact is, however, that prior to regulating the small boatyards 
the Regional Board had regulated much activity, including both the 
large boatyards and Chevron's effluent pipe. 83 The Regional Board 
has regulated the painting, cleaning, and discharge activities at the 
large drydock facilities with NPDES permits for over twenty 
years.84 Similarly, each of the large boatyards has an NPDES permit 
requiring that all waste solids from boat operations be collected and 
disposed of. 85 
In addition, the discharge from the small boatyards is more sig-
nificant than their small size would lead one to believe. The European 
experience demonstrated that the effects of TBT are most dangerous 
in quiet, shallow harbors filled with small marinas and boatyards. 86 
This experience demonstrated the significant threat that the small 
boatyards represent to nearby aquatic wildlife, and influenced the 
differential regulation of TBT paint between large and small ves-
sels. 87 . 
The problem was not that the large polluters were unregulated. 
The real problem was that the small boatyards saw themselves 
subject to a fairly aggressive regulatory standard while some large 
polluters-the drydocks-appeared to be subject only to good house-
keeping regulations, while others-Chevron-appeared to have a 
81 The cleaning, sanding, and overspraying from painting larger ships, if not controlled 
would generate a large amount of TBT waste. Adema & Schatzberg, supra note 16, at 211. 
For example, when painting a typical 100,000 square foot area ship, if only 10% of the paint 
being sprayed escaped, 200 pounds of TBT paint would be available to enter the environment. 
Id. 
82 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. 
83 Interview with Lila Tang and David Barr, Staff members, Regional Water Quality Control 
Board for San Francisco, in Oakland, CA (Nov. 2, 1990). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. In addition, the Bay Area Air Quality Management District requires the large dry-
docks to use curtains to prevent any sanding residue and painting overspray from escaping 
into the environment. Id. 
86 See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 19-20. 
87 See supra notes 2-13 and 22-25, and accompanying text. 
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license to pollute.88 This sense of unfairness was, in part, the inevi-
table result of the open-ended nature of the regulatory statute under 
which Bay pollution is regulated. The manner in which the boatyards 
were first regulated also exacerbated the sense of unfairness. 
c. The Importance oj Communication 
The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act proscribes the 
discharge of any material into the Bay without a permit.89 The Act 
provides minimal direction to the Regional Board, other than that 
the object of regulation is "to attain the highest water quality which 
is reasonable .... "90 Under such a broad mandate the challenge 
faced by the Board is twofold: first, to identify those discharges for 
which permits should be granted; and second, to decide which, 
among the myriad of as yet unregulated activities, should be moni-
tored. The Board thus has considerable discretion to decide both 
which activities to regulate, and how the regulation should proceed 
in each case. 91 
The Regional Board adopted a fairly pragmatic approach. For 
example, in theory there is no justification for any boatyard, large 
or small, to discharge any waste into the Bay. In reality, however, 
the nature of the work they conduct, which includes sanding, clean-
ing, and painting, will result in some discharge no matter what 
requirements are imposed. Accordingly, permits for large drydocks 
contain only simple requirements to ensure the cleanliness of the 
operation.92 Similarly, it would be impossible for Chevron to curtail 
all waste discharge. Consequently, the Regional Board issued Chev-
ron a permit imposing effluent quality standards and requiring Chev-
ron to construct a pipe into the deeper part of the Bay where its 
discharge is more rapidly diluted. 93 
Little of this background was explained to the small boatyards. 
All the boatyard owners understood was that they would no longer 
be able to drain their run-off into the Bay. No background justifi-
88 See supra notes 52--59 and accompanying text. 
89 See CAL WATER CODE § 13000 et seq (Deering 1992). 
90 CAL. WATER CODE, supra note 26, § 13200. 
91 See id. 
92 Interview with Tang & Barr, supra note 83. For example, NPDES Permit CAOOO5321 
for South West Marine Incorporated requires, inter alia, that "the discharger shall remove 
spent abrasives, paint residues and other debris from those positions of the dry-dock floor 
which are reasonably accessible ... by scraping and broom cleaning." Unpublished document, 
copy on file with author. 
93 Interview with Tang & Barr, supra note 83. 
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cation for the new regulation was provided largely because the Re-
gional Board staff did not believe an explanation was required. For 
example, although it is true that concerns about TBT led to the 
mandate in the PPD directing the Regional Boards to regulate small 
boat yards ,94 by the time the actual policy was announced the Re-
gional Board staff saw TBT as a red herring. Boatyards generate 
other toxic wastes such as other metals, paints, abrasives, oils, and 
solvents. Most of the Board staff were convinced that although TBT 
concerns may have catalyzed the issue, it was only a matter of time 
before small boatyards were regulated. 95 This point was made to the 
boatyard owners in December. "We're like water cops," Steve Rit-
chie, the Executive-Director of the Regional Board told the crowd 
at the December meeting, "and we've regulated the 'big guys,' and 
now we're looking at you." Unfortunately, this explanation had little 
mitigating impact. 
Ritchie's explanation was not well received in part because it failed 
to address adequately the fact that the Regional Board was now 
dealing with small businesses. At the December meeting, the small 
boatyards argued that they are different from their larger counter-
parts. They pointed out that larger businesses, such as the drydocks 
and Chevron, have a cadre of lawyers, consultants, and managers 
to interpret and minimize the impact of regulation. Many also pointed 
to the fact that individual boat owners are not prohibited from 
cleaning their boats underwater by hand. They complained that 
many more boat owners would choose to clean their own boats if the 
yards increased prices to cover the costs of compliance with the new 
policy. The large yards, on the other hand, would not experience the 
same loss because their clients have greater demand for maintenance 
and cannot maintain their boats themselves 
These observations all point to the importance of communication 
in the regulation of small polluters. When there is a widespread 
belief that a regulation is unimportant, or unjustified, compliance 
may be impaired.96 Communication to explain the context of a reg-
ulatory initiative will be required as often for the small, unsophis-
ticated polluter as for the large polluter already comfortable with 
regulation and with access to advisors to prepare for such exigencies. 
Unfounded rumors and a general sensitivity to regulation exacer-
94 See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text. 
95 Interviews with Mumley, supra note 44; Bowyer, supra note 75; and Tang & Barr, supra 
note 83. 
96 See Eugene Bardach & Robert A. Kagan, Going By The Book: The Problem of Regulatory 
Unreasonableness 112--19 (1982). 
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bated many of the concerns we observed within the boatyard com-
munity. Better initial communication could have minimized, albeit 
not prevented this heightened concern. 
IV. THE EFFECTS OF A COMPLAINT RESPONSE MECHANISM 
All regulatory agencies are public agents and as such must accept 
and reflect public opinion. The precise degree of accommodation to 
public opinion, however, will vary from agency to agency. Accord-
ingly, the impact of public complaints will vary from agency to 
agency. By responding to complaints an agency can expand the scope 
of its monitoring activity. Complaints can also raise issues which an 
agency might otherwise be unaware of or choose to ignore. In some 
circumstances, however, complaints can skew an agency's focus and 
can detract from the general application of regulations. 
The traditional concern about complaints is that they can cause 
valuable resources to be wasted responding to high profile but low 
priority cases. 97 The decision to regulate the small boatyards cannot 
be criticized on these grounds because the State Board in the PPD 
already had set the policy to regulate the boat yards. 98 Instead, the 
initial responses to the Baykeeper's complaints in this case created 
three slightly different problems. First, the complaints resulted in 
uneven regulation. Second, while the early focus on complaints did 
not lead the Regional Board to ignore the development of the general 
policy, this focus on the boatyards first complained about may have 
undermined significantly the subsequent long-term planning efforts. 
And finally, concern about the first two effects drove the Regional 
Board to implement its general policy faster than it had originally 
planned. 99 The latter effect requires no elaboration. The following 
sections consider the first two effects. 
A. Uneven Regulation 
Although the Regional Board attempted to address some of the 
boatyard owners' concerns at the December meeting, it was con-
97 Susan s. Silbey, The Consequences of Responsive Regulation, in ENFORCING REGULA-
TION, 147, 166 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, eds., 1984). For example, complaints may 
come from employees disgruntled about some other aspect of their employment, from com-
petitors striving to maintain an even playing field, or from firms that already have taken 
substantial steps toward compliance. [d. Although compliance may not be perfect in such 
circumstances, often regulatory resources could be better directed elsewhere. [d. 
98 See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text. 
99 Interview with Dale Bowyer, Senior Staff Officer, Regional Water Quality Control Board 
for San Francisco, in Oakland, CA (Dec. 12, 1990). 
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fronted with significant frustration and antagonism.1°O This hostility 
resulted from the way the yards first learned of the impending 
regulation. The initial regulation of small boatyards was not the 
result of a plan at all. Instead, starting in August, 1990 the Regional 
Board responded to several complaints by forcing certain boatyards 
to clean up existing waste and to reduce future discharge. In the 
absence of a general plan, the Regional Board's enforcement division 
responded on a case-by-case basis. This complaint-driven process 
resulted in a de facto regulatory scheme that was applied unevenly 
and imposed large costs on certain boat yards. 101 At some boatyards 
the Regional Board issued injunctions prohibiting all discharge. 102 
At other sites the Regional Board mandated the installation of spe-
cific equipment.103 And in three cases the Regional Board compelled 
the boatyards to prepare detailed plans describing how they would 
clean up the accumulated sediments around the yards. 104 
Even though these initial efforts ultimately were subsumed in the 
general program, the disruptive impact they had within the boatyard 
community hindered the Regional Board's capacity to implement the 
more general program. For example, before the December meeting 
M'K Veloz, head of a trade association of small boatyards and mar-
inas in the Bay area, stated that while her clients understood the 
need for regulation in principle, they were frustrated that the reg-
ulatory scheme was not being developed in a comprehensive or even-
handed manner. 105 
For the boatyards, apparently an unevenly implemented policy 
rewarded those who escape the first round of regulation, at the 
expense of those who were regulated earlier. 106 Uniform regulation 
is particularly important where compliance costs are relatively 
100 Unless otherwise noted, all references in Section IV to the activities of the parties 
involved in the regulation of the San Francisco Bay area are based on the notes made by the 
authors during the December 7 meeting and related events. 
101 For example, the status reports required regulated boatyards to hire environmental 
consultants and to perform chemical analyses for metals and other substances. Interview with 
Balcolm, supra note 45. A single organotin (TBT) analysis costs approximately $300. Id. 
102 Interviews with Ray Balcolm, Enforcement Officer, Regional Water Quality Control 
Board for San Francisco, in Oakland, CA (Oct. 3, 1990 and Nov. 12, 1990). 
103 Interviews with Ray Balcolm, Enforcement Officer, Regional Water Quality Control 
Board for San Francisco, in Oakland, CA (Oct. 3, 1990 and Nov. 12, 1990). 
104 Interviews with Ray Balcolm, Enforcement Officer, Regional Water Quality Control 
Board for San Francisco, in Oakland, CA (Oct. 3, 1990 and Nov. 12, 1990). 
106 Interview with M'K Veloz, Administrative Director, Northern California Marine Asso-
ciation, in Alameda, CA (Sept. 28, 1990). 
106 See supra notes 73-75, 97-105 and accompanying text. 
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high. 107 For these reasons the initial lack of coordination undermined 
the boatyards' trust in the Board's competence and preconditioned 
their receptivity to the final program. 
B. The Impetus Toward a Deterrence-Based Approach 
The Baykeeper is a non-profit organization reliant on public do-
nations for its funding. It depends on fast, visible results both for 
its income and the morale of its volunteers. Consequently, it pres-
sured the Regional Board for short term, quick-fix solutions. Balcolm 
responded as if on cue. This Section suggests that Balcolm's response 
was predictable given the nature of his job and the type of clients 
he was regulating. This type of regulation, however, may not always 
be appropriate. Indeed, ad hoc, responsive regulation may be an-
tithetical to a long term, negotiation-based strategy. Although the 
choice of a regulatory style must depend largely on the particular 
context, it is important to ensure that those choices are established 
in as comprehensive and rational a manner as possible. Regulatory 
strategy should not be adopted either unwittingly or unwillingly as 
a result of an unplanned process. 
In general, socio-Iegal scholars suggest that regulators must 
choose between a "deterrence" model of regulation and a "compli-
ance" model. lOS A deterrence approach is a sanctioning strategy 
associated with a focus on incidents of rule breaking, and character-
ized by a penal enforcement style. lOS A compliance strategy is char-
acterized by a conciliatory style of enforcement that generally only 
emerges in the context of an ongoing relationship between the reg-
ulator and the regulated enterprise. 110 
A compliance strategy requires a significant up-front investment 
of time and resources to develop the necessary mutual understanding 
and appreciation of each sides' needs. 111 In contrast, the Regional 
Board is more crisis-driven. 112 As was the case with the Regional 
107 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 58-59 
(1969) (classic statement of the principle that like cases should be treated alike). 
108 From Sawdust to Toxic Blobs: A Consideration of Sanctioning Strategies to Combat 
Pollution in Canada, (Law Refonn Commission of Canada), 1988, at 7 [hereinafter Sawdust]; 
Keith Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and The Social Definition of 
Pollution 4 (1984). 
109 See Sawdust, supra note 108, at 7. 
110 See id. at 7-8. 
111 See generally Bardach & Kagan, supra note 96 at 152-83. 
112 One member of the Regional Board staff told us "what [the Regional Board staff mem-
bers] do around here is like triage; we deal with the biggest and the most visible problems 
first and then move on to the next crisis." Interview with Bowyer, supra note 75. 
470 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 20:453 
Board, when pressed and particularly when subject to public pres-
sure from a complaints mechanism, an agency will opt for, or find 
itself de facto adopting, a more reactive, deterrence model. 113 
In particular, regulators dealing with small, unsophisticated or 
independent, entrepreneurial-style enterprises tend to adopt a more 
ad-hoc, deterrence oriented enforcement strategy.114 The general 
assumption is that a small, marginal operation will be more driven 
to match its competitor's bottom line than will a larger enterprise. 115 
The smaller enterprise will thus be more tempted to avoid compli-
ance than a larger, less competition-sensitive enterprise. 116 In such 
cases, cooperation may not be forthcoming and strict enforcement 
may appear warranted. 117 
Strict enforcement can be useful in some circumstances. Inflexible 
and rapid enforcement can have a significant deterrent effect, es-
pecially in a community similar to the boatyards in which information 
and rumors travel quickly.118 In some cases strict enforcement will 
send an important signal to those who voluntarily comply, assuring 
them that they will not be harmed economically by their compli-
ance. 119 Strong regulation also can send an important signal to the 
general public, whose support is critical both for moral justification 
and for continued financing of the regulatory agency.120 Finally, no 
matter what strategy is adopted ultimately, strict enforcement pro-
vides the credible threat necessary in any negotiation process. 
On the other hand, the small boatyards situation indicates that 
the tendency to regulate small polluters by means of an ad hoc 
deterrence model can produce only limited results. In particular, this 
case study demonstrates that where firms are small and not prepared 
113 See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text. 
114 Robert A. Kagan, Understanding Regulatory Compliance, 11 LAW & POL'y 89, 103 
(1989). 
115Id. 
116 See ROBERT A. LEONE, WHO PROFITS: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN GoVERNMENT REG-
ULATION 43-49 (1986). This generalization will not always be true. Some enterprises, such as 
small professional firms, flourish in highly regulated environments. Kagan, supra note 114, at 
103. 
117 See, e.g., supra § III (discussing small boatyards' reaction to increased costs from 
regulation). 
118 For example, at least one boatyard owner revised his yard's operations in response to 
the rumors concerning the severe treatment of some of his competitors. Interview with Haley, 
supra note 80. 
119 Neal Shover, et aI., Regional Variation in Regulatory Law Enforcement, in ENFORCING 
REGULATIONS, supra note 97, at 137-46. 
120 For an example of the general public's power, see supra notes 60-62 and accompanying 
text (discussing PPD's creation). See also supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text (discussing 
Baykeeper's role in initiating small boatyard regulation). 
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for the demands of regulatory compliance, there will be limits to the 
effectiveness of a coercive strategy, no matter how clear cut the 
applied standard. 
Excessive legalism and inflexibility create many problems. Inflex-
ibility can turn a regulated enterprise's disposition to comply with 
the law into an active disposition to resist. 121 Unless a firm is likely 
to comply voluntarily and requires no further monitoring, or ulti-
mately will have to be forced into compliance, regulation generally 
will be more successful if some effort is made to explain the need 
for the regulation, the magnitude of the problem, and the reason-
ableness of the rules. 122 It was the failure to communicate adequately 
with the boatyards before the Regional Board started responding to 
complaints in August that lay at the root of the anger, confusion, 
and resistance the Regional Board faced when it introduced the more 
comprehensive policy in December.123 Such early communication did 
not occur largely because the initial action was in the form of ad hoc 
deterrence style responses to isolated complaints. l24 
In deciding what approach to adopt, regulators often will consider 
the economic consequences of compliance. 125 In some cases the sta-
tutory mandate explicitly will require such a balancing. 126 For ex-
ample, the Porter Cologne Act requires that the State Board con-
sider the economic consequences before the adoption of a given 
standard. 127 To the extent that economic consequences are consid-
ered, the capacity of a regulated firm to absorb or pass on costs, or 
for other compliant firms to take over their social functions, should 
be a critical limitation to the stringency of the regulatory style. 128 
When compliance costs are high and difficult to pass on, there will 
be an inevitable tendency to avoid compliance. 129 In such cases, a 
very strict enforcement stance may be appropriate. Where compli-
ance costs reach a level that threatens the economic viability of the 
regulated enterprise, however, continued legalistic enforcement of 
an inflexible standard not only will not secure further compliance, 
but also may be counterproductive. 130 
121 Bardach & Kagan, supra note 96, at 112--19. 
122 [d. at 119. 
123 See supra notes 68-96 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
125 ROBERT A. KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE 10-13 (1978). 
126 See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE, § 13000. 
127 [d. 
128 See Bardach & Kagan, supra note 96, at 68-69. 
129 See Leone, supra note 116, at 43-50. 
130 See Bardach & Kagan, supra note 96, at 112--19. 
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While the Regional Board staff members responsible for designing 
the regulatory program for the small boatyards were concerned with 
uniformity as a means to minimize unnecessary economic disrup-
tions, the initial action taken in response to complaints reflected no 
such concern. Balcolm saw his job as "busting polluters. "131 The 
frustration and resistance this approach engendered was inevitable. 
But Balcolm's actions, at least in part, were the inevitable result of 
his job role. 
There is little doubt that Balcolm's attitude toward his job in part 
explains his actions. Personal attitudes are important in shaping 
field-level behavior.132 As one would expect, the most important 
attitudinal factors are the attitudes most proximate to the adminis-
trative task being performed. 133 In particular, the individual regu-
lator's view of those being regulated134 and his or her "rule 
orientation"135 will be key determinants of implementation decisions. 
Regardless of his personal views, however, Balcolm's job descrip-
tion limited his capacity to make the type of comprehensive, balanc-
ing assessment his planning colleagues made. Balcolm was required 
to respond to complaints. 136 The Regional Board encourages its field 
staff to be "gung ho" in dealing with polluters. 137 Although ideally, 
field staff discretion should be constrained within the framework of 
a regulatory program, no such program existed when Balcolm 
started to respond to Baykeeper complaints. l38 He either could have 
decided that there were no constraints on his discretion, or that he 
was obliged to apply the letter of the law. In the face of an unequiv-
ocal standard-no permit, no discharge-and absent an overriding 
program, Balcolm's insistence on strict compliance was understand-
able. The point is not that Balcolm erred; it is that the counterpro-
ductive results of his action were predictable, and could have been 
avoided by a clearer policy concerning complaints. 
C. Implementing Public Perception 
The issue of how to accommodate public participation in regulatory 
activity is very difficult and raises fundamental questions of public 
131 Interview with Balcolm, supra note 70. 
132 David M. Hedge, et aI., Regulatory Attitudes and Behavior: The Case of Surface Mining 
Regulation, 41 W. POL. Q. 323, 323-24 June 1988; see generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-
LEVEL BUREAUCRACY (1980). 
133 Hedge et aI, supra note 132, at 335. 
134 [d. 
135 [d. 
136 Interview with Bowyer, supra note 99. 
137 [d. 
138 See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. 
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policy. Although regulations often reflect public opinion, responsive 
regulation can be criticized for replacing the interest of the com-
monwealth with the particular interests of the participating par-
ties. 139 Agency priorities can be skewed, and important regulatory 
decisions can be determined on an ad hoc basis simply by responding 
to public complaints. l40 More fundamentally, complaint-driven reg-
ulation can result in unequal application of the law. 141 Ideally, the 
law should create a common set of standards that all members of 
society should take into account before acting.142 By failing to make 
the law's application "general," responsive regulation undermines 
one of the central tenets of the rule of law. 143 
In the context of consumer protection legislation this unequal 
application can undermine the purpose of the regulation because the 
law is only enforced in response to random complaints. l44 By focuss-
ing the regulator's attention only on the individual case, complaints 
mechanisms preclude the effective general implementation of a stan-
dard. 145 In many cases, where the probability of getting "caught" 
and the cost of punishment are low compared to the costs of com-
pliance, businesses may simply continue to operate as before, ad-
dressing regulatory censure as it arises but making no fundamental 
change to comply with the violated regulation. 146 On the other hand, 
this case study demonstrates that ad hoc complaint-driven regulation 
not only can be unfair, but also can generate resentment and resis-
tance to the continued enforcement of the law. 147 As such, public 
participation in the enforcement of the law, unless placed in the 
context of a comprehensive regulatory scheme, can subvert the very 
purposes of the regulation. 
If complaints emerge and the regulatory authority answers them 
in the context of an established program then some internal capacity 
to balance priorities will exist. If the agency has not developed a 
program for the regulation of a particular class of polluters, however, 
but does have a complaints mechanism in place, that mechanism may 
139 See P.R. Gulliver, Negotiations as a Mode of Dispute Settlement: Towards a General 
Model, 7 L. & Soc. REV. 667, 680-83 (1973). 
140 See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text. 
142 See generally, LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); see also JOHN RAWLS, 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-43 (1971). 
143 For Rawls and Fuller, generality is one of the critical variables for determining legality. 
See generally FULLER, supra, note 142; RAWLS, supra note 142. 
144 Silbey, supra note 97, at 148. 
146 [d. at 161-62. 
146 [d. at 162-63. 
147 See supra § IV.A-B. 
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drive the establishment of the program on an ad hoc basis. 148 As this 
case study demonstrates, the tendency towards ad hoc regulation 
may be enhanced in the case of small polluters, where the agency 
typically is not predisposed to devote significant resources to the 
development or implementation of a comprehensive plan. 149 
The Regional Board ultimately did attempt to minimize the impact 
of the complaint process on the eventual comprehensive program by 
restraining the complaint response activities. There is little doubt, 
however, that the very aggressive initial response to complaints 
significantly conditioned the boatyards' attitude to any future regu-
latory efforts. 
V. FLEXIBILITY VERSUS GUIDANCE 
Sections III and IV are critical of the Regional Board's initial 
handling of this regulation. This Section, on the other hand, suggests 
that the Regional Board ultimately developed a regulatory scheme 
that balanced successfully the Regional Board's interest in regula-
tory efficacy with the small boatyards' interests in uniformity, guid-
ance, and certainty.l50 
There is an inherent tension between guidance and flexibility. 
Much recent literature has focussed on the importance of flexibility 
in stimulating innovation and in encouraging economically efficient 
regulation. 151 Critics of command-and-control regulation argue that 
incentive-based regulation permits compliance at least-cost to society 
by encouraging innovation. 152 In addition, proponents argue that 
incentive-based regulation is more effective in focussing regulatory 
and public attention on the desired environmental outcome rather 
than on the question of what is the proper procedure or technology. 153 
Even within the ambit of command and control regulation, significant 
148 See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. 
14. See supra § III. 
150 Unless otherwise noted, references in Section V to the activities of the parties involved 
in the regulation of the San Francisco Bay area are based on the authors' observations during 
the period in question. 
151 See generally Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental 
Regulation: A New Erafor an Old Idea? 18 EcoLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991). 
152 Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 
13 COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 153, 159-60 (1988); See also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE 
E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, (2d ed. 1988); T.H. TIETENBERG, 
EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY 56-58 (1985). 
153 Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Dem-
ocratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 171,194-96 (1988). 
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emphasis is placed now on the value of the flexibility that perfor-
mance standards afford relative to design standards. 154 
The boatyards experience indicates that there may be limits to 
the advantages of flexibility. The same characteristics that raise 
concerns about uniform regulation-small, highly competitive busi-
nesses, operating close to the margin and relatively unaccustomed 
to regulationl55-also raise concerns about the appropriate form of 
regulation for this type of enterprise. For this category of small 
polluters, the need for explicit guidance may overwhelm any theo-
retical benefits from flexibility. 156 
Once the general complaints had subsided at the December meet-
ing, the boatyards' most important concern was to receive clear 
guidance on their new obligations. The boatyards articulated this 
concern most clearly in response to a presentation at the December 
meeting by a representative of the Department of Health Services 
(DHS). The Regional Board had invited DHS because much of the 
material the boatyards could no longer wash into the Bay would have 
to be collected and disposed of as hazardous waste under DHS rules. 
The DHS representative confirmed the possibility that some of the 
waste would require special disposal procedures, but insisted that it 
was the individual operators' obligation to determine what is and is 
not hazardous waste, leaving them only with the guideline that 
hazardous waste is defined as "anything that kills life." The boatyard 
representatives were unsatisfied with this explanation. 157 The mes-
sage was that not only would the boatyards have to comply with the 
hazardous waste regulations, on pain of fines or even criminal sanc-
tions, but that they would be held responsible even for an honest 
mistake in classification. 
The Regional Board could have followed the DHS lead and simply 
prohibited all discharge into the Bay, leaving the choice of compliance 
measures to the boatyards' discretion. From the regulator's per-
spective this approach has a number of advantages in addition to 
164 Benoit Laplante, Environmental Regulation: Perfarmance and Design Standards, in 
GETTING IT GREEN: CASE STUDIES IN CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 59, 59-61 
(G.B. Doern, ed., 1990). 
166 See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text. 
166 See, e.g., DiMento, supra note 1, at 1-18 ("Mushrooms and Mercuries" case studies, 
small polluters' overwhelming complaint was insufficient guidance from regulators as to how 
to comply). 
157 After repeated questions as to whether collected solid materials would be considered 
"hazardous", one frustrated owner shouted out ''you keep using the word 'probably' ... we 
came here to find out what is and what isn't!" Notes from December meeting, supra note 76, 
on file with author. 
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holding out the theoretical potential for least-cost compliance. For 
example, imposition of a technology-based requirement results in 
investment in a particular type of compliance technology. Because 
the regulatory authority has sanctioned that technology, it can rep-
resent a significant barrier to future regulatory changes that require 
a new procedure or technology.l58 In addition, in a multi-jurisdic-
tional environment, it can be risky for one regulatory agency to 
prescribe a compliance technology or procedure if there is any pos-
sibility that compliance with that procedure will undermine compli-
ance with the requirements of other regulatory agencies-like the 
air board or the DHS in the boatyard case. 159 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Regional Board was sensitive 
to the boatyards' interest in obtaining some guidance and certainty. 
The Board avoided the formality of licensing systems by leaving the 
boatyards free to implement any system they chose, subject to the 
bottom line requirement of no discharge into the Bay. On the other 
hand, for those seeking certainty, Bowyer indicated that he and his 
colleagues would informally approve containment methods before 
implementation. The tacit assurance was that the Regional Board 
would not come down hard on any boatyard that made a good faith 
effort to construct a containment device after its plan had been 
approved. Within six months, most of the boatyards had taken ad-
vantage of this opportunity. 160 
The system implemented by the Regional Board probably induced 
greater compliance than could have been attained under either a 
strict command-and-control approach or a strict incentive-based 
scheme with no guidance. The Regional Board had to contend with 
the competing considerations of the boatyards' predisposition to re-
sist any regulation on the one hand, and their concern for uniformity 
and guidance, on the other hand. Neither the Board nor most of the 
boatyards had the resources to contend with a wide-open incentive-
based scheme. By making itself available for consultation and guid-
ance, the Board allowed the risk-averse small businesses to avoid 
158 Ackennan & Stewart, supra note 153, at 189; TIETENBERG, supra note 152, at 15-16. 
159 Bowyer and Mumley explained that these two reasons-and not any considerations about 
economic efficiency-were the main reasons the Water Board has moved where possible to 
more flexible, incentive-based standards. Interview with Thomas Mumley, Director of Policy, 
Regional Water Quality Control Board for San Francisco, and Dale Bowyer, Senior Staff 
Officer, Regional Water Quality Control Board for San Francisco, in Oakland, CA (Sept. 12, 
1990). 
160 Telephone interview with Dale Bowyer, Senior Staff Officer, Regional Water Quality 
Control Board for San Francisco (May, 15, 1991). 
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both the expenses of independently developing containment mecha-
nisms and the possibility of costly non-compliance. At the same time, 
however, the Board was able to impose relatively uniform require-
ments, thereby minimizing the burden of monitoring a wide variety 
of compliance schemes. 161 
One of the main concerns about command and control regulation 
is that it is disrespectful of corporate independence, and as such 
inhibits compliance. 162 In this case, a single inflexible technology-
based requirement might have exacerbated the antipathy and resis-
tance toward the Regional Board's efforts. Thus, even while Bowyer 
set out to impose as uniform a procedure as possible, the veneer of 
flexibility promised may have allayed some concerns. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In an era of government constraint, it must be tempting for the 
regulator to pay little attention to small polluters. Instead, this case 
study indicates that regulators should pay close attention when reg-
Ulating small polluters. In particular, regulators should stress attri-
butes such as active communication, uniform application of regula-
tory standards, and explicit guidance when regulating small 
polluters. 
It is also important to consider the role of public input in the 
development of both legislative and regulatory schemes. Public input 
is integral to our notions of democratic governance. The story of the 
development of TBT legislation is testimony to the fact that public 
participation can result in improved standards. It must also be rec-
ognized, however, that the institutionalization of a complaint re-
sponse mechanism can skew an agency's ability to establish a rational 
and comprehensive agenda. Over-reliance on complaints can result 
in non-uniform regulation, which is particularly problematic for small 
polluters. 
When regulating small polluters, agencies also should beware of 
the pressures that tend to result in the adoption of a deterrence 
model of regulation. Although such an approach might be dictated 
161 Bowyer's plan was to urge each of the boatyards to implement one of two types of 
systems: one involved filtering and recycling the wastewater, the other released the effluent 
into the sewer system. He presented the alternatives in the least palatable way, emphasizing 
that any system which resulted in discharges into the Bay would require issuance of a permit 
and periodic testing of the effluent at the expense of the boatyard. Interviews with Dale 
Bowyer, supra notes 75 & 99. 
162 Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 153, at 174. 
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by limited resources, regulators should be wary that a deterrence 
model might in the long run interfere with the development of a 
coherent, negotiation-based strategy. Over-responsiveness to public 
complaints can enhance this tendency. This is not to suggest that a 
deterrence strategy will always be wrong. However, it is important 
to understand this tendency in order to retain control of the regu-
latory agenda: the decision to regulate or monitor a new activity 
should not simply be a matter of responding-or not responding-
to a perceived problem. 
Finally, the lack of sophistication of many small polluters should 
compel a rethinking of the emerging emphasis on regulatory mech-
anisms designed to maximize flexibility. Certain categories of small, 
unsophisticated businesses may lack the capacity to take advantage 
of the theoretical potential for least-cost compliance held out by 
flexible regulation. Accordingly, there often will be a compelling 
reason to provide more explicit guidance to small polluters than 
would be provided to large polluters. 
The allocation of resources to the regulation of large polluters 
typically has been supported by broad public concern. The selection 
of an enforcement strategy for large polluters is thus likely to be 
made in the context of a planned program. As regulatory agencies 
and the public turn their attention to small polluters, it will be 
important to ensure that decisions continue to be made in as com-
prehensive and rational a manner as possible. 
